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One way to interpret the current policies of many central banks is that they seek to stabilize economic
activity. One possible justiﬁcation for such a policy is that there is volatility in macro variables that individual
agents cannot insure against. We study the simplest possible extension of the stochastic 2-period, one agent
and one commodity OLG model, where we have added 1 more period, with only one potential activity, namely
trading of contingent commodities. We assume, however, that markets are incomplete. In this case the monetary
equilibrium is not Pareto Optimal and for an open set of economies an equilibrium where ﬂuctuations in realized
savings are removed Pareto dominates the monetary equilibrium. A combination of ﬁscal and monetary policy
may achieve this equilibrium . The policy considered has a simple rationale, namely that it removes some of
the uncertainty that agents face by reducing price or interest rate volatility.
We consider two fundamental sources of such volatility, namely respectively an objective and a subjective
signal about the distribution of future endowments. The ﬁrst case is when agents have Rational Expectations
while the second case is studied in the context of agents having Rational Beliefs, beliefs which are consistent
with empirical observations but not (necessarily) correct.
Keywords: Stabilization, OLG, Incomplete Markets, Macroeconomic Policy, Rational Expectations,
Rational Beliefs
JEL classiﬁcation number: D5,D84,E34,E52,E63
1This paper was written under a fellowship from Bank of Spain1 Introduction
In a ﬁnite world with complete markets (and the usual asumptions), the observed price volalitily,
although having a negative impact on risk averse agents, is simply reﬂecting the randomness of under-
lying fundamentals. A policy that seeks to curb the price volatility will only inhibit the well functioning
of the market economy and is thus mistaken. None the less one can interpret the contemporay policies
of many central banks as trying to control the level of economic activity using the interest rate . If one
believes that the rationale of such policies is that they are Pareto improving, then some of the assump-
tions of the classical General Equilibrium model has to be reconsidered. In this paper we consider a
simple 3-period OLG model with incomplete markets and show how economic stabilization may be
walfare improving. Volatility in economic activity is created by volatility in demand and supply. Thus
curbing the volatility is done by controlling (directly or indirectly) the actions of agents. There is
then clearly a trade-oﬀ, since from the individual agent’s viewpoint, the ideal policy would control the
actions of all other agents, and thus control the (price) volatility he is facing, but would allow himself
to act freely. In this paper this trade-oﬀ is exposed and some conditions for when a stabilizing policy
is considered beneﬁcial for the individual (representative) agents are provided.
The role of the OLG model is twofold. Firstly, in it an explanation for existence of money is derived.
However, this is not the the fundamental reason for using the OLG model here. It is conjectured that
also if the existence of money was modeled by assuming cash-in-advance constraints the argument for
price-stabilization would be valid. The more fundamental reason for using the OLG model is then that
it is a realistic inﬁnte horizon model. The inﬁnite horizon is an informal justiﬁcation for assuming that
agents’ beliefs have settled down to being consistent with empirical regularities, that is, depending on
the choice of auxilliary assumptions, that they are either Rational Expectations or Rational Beliefs.
Sunspots in the OLG model have been used to explain why unwarranted economic volatility un-
related to fundamentals may be present in the economy (se for instance Azariadis(1981)). But there
are some open questions regarding this explanation. Firstly, removing the price instability caused
by sunspot is not improving when one uses Contingent Pareto Optimality as welfare concept (as was
alredy noted by Cass and Shell(1983) - see Nielsen(2001) for further details). If on the other hand
one wishes to use Equal Treatment Optimality as a criterion then the stationary distribution is no
longer optimal in a model with stochastic fundamentals. Stabilization is then no longer an obvious
choice and just describing the optimal allocations becomes diﬃcult even in the two-period model that
is usually being used (see Nielsen, 2001). Thirdly, one may doubt whether a realistic version of the
2OLG model (where agents live for many periods) can explain the magnitude and form of real and
nominal ﬂuctuations observed in the economy. The sunspots eﬀects in the OLG model are the result
of random reallocations from/to newborn generations, via an inﬂationary tax/subsidy. Apart from the
issue whether this is a realistic description of what happens during the business cycle is the question,
whether the magnitude of such transfers in a monetary equilibrium are realistic. In the case where
agents live for 2 periods a relatively high proportion of the economy’s ressources can be shifted from
one generation to another in equilibrium. But how much can be shifted between the ﬁrst generation
and the 77 remaining in a monetary equilibrium? This is an issue that seems to call for further
investigations.
Another explanation provided for ”excess” price volatility is incompleteness of markets2 as for
instance studied in Calvet(1998) . The New Keynesian macroeconomics litterature in assuming that
individual suppliers whose prices are ﬁxed in the short run cannot insure against shocks that would
make them want to change prices, see for instance Woodford(2001). Both in Calvet, Woodford and
here there is thus some incompleteness of markets that is not explained from fundamental principles.
This seems to be the case for most, if not all, studies of the explicit welfare eﬀects of monetary policies
(see also, Lorenzoni, 2000).
The standard two-period one commodity OLG model with a single agent trivially has (sequentially)
complete markets, in the sense that agents who live at the same time can freely trade in all spot and
contingent commodities, but will not do so. It is only by assuming that (representative) agents live
for more than two periods, that there are more than one commodity or that there are hetereogenous
agents that the issue of completeness becomes nontrivial. Except for the last possibility such models
are unfortunately in general diﬃcult to study if one are interested in equilibria which are ergodic
and stationary or, more generally, from which an empirical distribution of prices can be extracted
(see Duﬃe, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan(1994) and Gottardi(1996)). Therefore, we have
chosen to study only the simplest possible extension of the representative agent model, namely where
agents live for 3 periods and their potential activity in the ﬁrst period is only to trade contingent
commodities. Markets are however assumed to be incomplete and such trade cannot take place.
It should be noted, that as is often the case for incomplete markets models, no explanations for
why markets are incomplete is oﬀered here. We show how stabilizing economic activity may improve
welfare. Of course this means that active monetary/ﬁscal policies matter, something which has already
been shown in many contexts (see for instance Gottardi(1995) for the case of an OLG model, with
2Note that when markets are incomplete another type of sunspot induced volatility may be present
3heterogeneous agents who live for two periods). But the explicit study of the eﬀects of economic
stabilization found in this paper appears to be new.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section a simple version of the OLG model is
described. Furthermore we introduce two interpretations of the model, one assuming that agents
hold Rational Expectations the other assuming that they hold Rational Beliefs. We also consider two
possible concepts of Pareto Optimality known from the literature and argue in favour of one of them.
In the following section we study the features of the monetary equilibria and provide the policy results.
The appendices deals with more technical issues. In the ﬁrst we show some of the results for a more
general version of the model. In the other appendix we provide a brief introduction to the theory of
Rational Beliefs.
2 The one-commodity OLG model; Rational Expectations and Ra-
tionale Beliefs
2.1 Model and Monetary Equilibrium
We consider an overlapping generations model with one commodity where agents are born in the ﬁrst
period , receive endowments ea in the second period and a random endowment, et either eb or ec in the
third and ﬁnal period of their lives. Furthermore, in the second period of their lives the agents receive
a signal, zt 2 f1;2g about the (objective or perceived) distribution, ¼z = (¼z
b;¼z
c) (with ¼1 6= ¼2) of the
endowments in the last period of their lives3. The stochastic sequence fztg is i.i.d. and independent
of past et with probability vector (q1;q2).
Agents, which are all ex-ante identical, only have utility, u (deﬁned on <2
++, C2, strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and with indiﬀerence curves whose closures are contained in <2
++) over consumption
in the second and third period of their lifes4. So we essentially have a classical OLG model, except that
agents are born before they know what ”type” they are, i.e. before they know the signal about the
distribution of the endowments in the last period of their lifes. We consider a monetary equilibrium
for this economy, assuming that the amount of outside ﬁat money is 1 unit. In such an equilibrium
there will be two possible prices (of money in terms of the commodity good),p1 and p2, at each date
t, depending on signal of the then middle-aged.
DEFINITION 1 Monetary Equilibrium. Price vector (p1;p2) 2 <2
++ such that when an agent with
3In appendix 4.1 we study the case where the number of signals and second period endowments is arbitrary but ﬁnite.
4When making genericity statements the topology of C
2 uniform convergence on compacta (MasColell(1985),p.50) is
used.
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the solution is M = 1








(ea ¡ pk;es + pi)pk +
@u
@x2
(ea ¡ pk;es + pi)pi]qi¼k
s = 0;k = 1;2 (2)
Such an equilibrium (where money is valued) may or may not exist, depending on preferences (and
beliefs). In appendix 4.1 a suﬃcient condition for existence is provided.
REMARK 1
We will sometimes refer to the two-period version of the model considered here. In this version agents
live for two periods corresponding to the two last periods of the three-period version of the model, i.e.
when they are born the signal about the distribution of endowments in the last period of their life has
already been realized. Despite this diﬀerence, for the two-period version of the model the deﬁnition
of monetary equilibrium is exactly as above.
2.2 Interpretation of zt
We provide two diﬀerent not necessarily exclusive explanations for the presence of the signal zt. Ac-
cording to the ﬁrst, zt is an objective signal about the distribution of the endowments the next period,
and as such can be considered to be a supply shock, about which agents hold Rational Expectations.
According to the other explanation, zt is a signal which coordinates the subjective expectations
of the agents, expectations which may not necessarily be correct. That subjective beliefs are indeed
present and signiﬁcant even among major actors on the ﬁnancial markets is convincingly demonstrated
in Kurz(2002). When the signals are guiding subjective beliefs they can better be interpreted as a
demand shock in that it eﬀects the beliefs i.e. preferences of agents. In the context of this second
explanation agents are supposed to hold Rational Beliefs about the distribution of the endowments5.
The empirical distribution of the endowments is assumed to be known6. The Rational Beliefs story
postulates that agents may think that more can be known than just this empirical distribution.
Speciﬁcally, agents may form statistical models or theories according to which the endowment process,
5See Appendix 4.2 for a brief introduction to the theory of Rational Beliefs, and Kurz(1994a) and Kurz(1994b) for
more comprehensive introductions.
6We note in passing that this assumption together with the assumption that the true distribution is known to be
stationary would lead to the conclusion that agents have Rational Expectations about the distribution of the endowments.
5fetg is correlated with a process of signals fztg. We do not assume that the agents know the empirical
distribution of the joint process fet;ztg, only that they know they know the two marginals of the
empirical distribution, each assumed to be i.i.d.. We denote the empirical distribution of fetg by
B = (B1;B2). The type of statistical model we consider in the context of this paper is as follows.
When agents at date t observe zt = i;i = 1;2 they pick the belief Bi = (¼i
b;¼i
c), which they hold to be
the distribution of the the endowments in the following period. To simplify and unify the exposition
of the model zt is assumed to be known to be i.i.d. Assuming, as we did, that both the empirical
distribution of fetg and of fztg is known, rational agents can only adopt a statistical model, or belief if
it generates the same empirical distribution of the endowments as the known one. The model generates
the empirical distribution q1B1 + q2B2 and consequently, what we call the rationality requirement is
q1B1 + q2B2 = B (3)
It is interesting to note, that endowing agents with rational Beliefs is one way to formulate over-
conﬁdence on their part. When agents have (non-stationary) Rational Beliefs they use a model for
the savings decission which is more informative than the data itself, namely the two empirical distri-
butions, i.e. they are conﬁdent that they know more than what the data provides them with. This
puts the theory on line with several psychological studies of human behavior, cited in Odean(1998)
and Daniel, Hirschleifer, and Subrahmanyam(1998).
Looking forward the statistical models or beliefs that agents are employing are rational. Looking
backwards agents may discover that the model did not work well, i.e. that zt was on average not a
good predictor of et+1. The gambler in the casino or the investor on the stock market may look back
and realize that his past strategy was not performing well. He may never the less believe that his
model will perform better in the future. Or he may choose another model/beliefs. From our viewpoint
this amounts to the same, the last just being a renaming of the signal. What matters is that agents
continues to use subjective rational beliefs in a stable way, i.e. such that not only exogenous but also
endogenous variables are having an empirical distribution.
REMARK 2
Let us note that there is a problem of interpretation of the model of the beliefs as presented here.
Presumably agents would know the emprical distribution of the joint process of prices and endowments.
But since prices are determined by beliefs, i.e. zt, implicitly they know the empirical distribution of
the joint process fzt;etg, something we assumed that they did not realize. In fact this problem cen be
6remedied, but at the expensive of introducing a much more complicated model, see Nielsen (1998b)
for details.
One approach to understanding the Rational Beliefs story is to think of it as a logically consistent
way to formalize the idea that the priors may have a permanent eﬀect on the beliefs of agents. With
only a minor departure from the Rational Expectations framework this is achieved. As a result agents
may have diverse subjective beliefs, even when confronted with the same statistical data, something
we, however, do not emphasize in this context. Another consequence is that volatility in endogenous
variables may not have as the only source, volatilty in ”fundamentals”, but may be generated by
subjective changes in the myopic beliefs of agents. This story may help to explain the apparant
observation, for instance in the stock markets, that endogenous variables like prices tend to be more
volatile than exogenous variables like technological shocks7. This observation is one motivation for
many recent theoretical investigations of the eﬀects of stabilizing policies, based on indeterminacy,
i.e. sunspot equilibria (see f.i. Christiano and Harrison, 1996). However, in this new strand of
macroeconomic literature the assumption that agents have Rational Expectations is maintained.
In the context of the present model, we do not need to distinguish between the two types of sources
of volatility, signals about endowments (technology) or subjective signals. This is due to two factors.
Firstly, for the Rational Beliefs version of the model we have assumed perfect correlation between
beliefs. Some correlation is needed for subjective changes in expectations to show up in aggregated
like prices, but the correlation need certaintly not be perfect8. As the heterogeneity of beliefs increases
the analysis below becomes more complicated and this is one reason why we have chosen the simpler
case. Incidently, one way to emprically separate the Rational Expectations case from the Rational
Beliefs case is by looking for heterogeneity of beliefs among equally informed market participants.
Such heterogeneity has been observed in the markets for foreign exchange (see Taylor, 1995) and in
ﬁnancial markets (see Odean, 1998 and Daniel, Hirschleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998) for reviews
of the literature and further references. See also Kurz(1997) for a view on endogenous ﬂuctuations
and diversity of beliefs from the viewpoint of the theory of Rational Beliefs ). The fact that there
are diversity of opinions about the lifespan of bubbles or whether increasing prices on stocks or land
constitute a bubble at all may for then cast doubt on the assertation that such bubbles are rational.
7This kind of volatility which becomes endogenous uncertainty (Deﬁned in Kurz, 1974) when agents do not know
the future beliefs of others has in the context of an OLG model previously been studied in Kurz and Wu(1996) and
Motolese(1998)
8In Kurz(1998) it is demonstrated that even without correlation between beliefs excess volatility may be generated.
72.3 Some concepts of Optimality
Several concepts of Pareto Optimality have been studied in the literature, two notable being that
of Conditional Pareto Optimality (also called Dynamical Pareto Optimality in Cass and Shell(1983)
and that of Equal Treatment-Pareto Optimality (deﬁned in Muench(1977)). In Peled(1982) these two
notions are compared and it is argued that Conditional Pareto Optimality is the right criterion. When
using the Conditional Pareto Optimality criterion the deﬁnition of an agent includes the stochastic
state in which he is born. Thus Pareto improving transfers cannot make an agent born in some
state worse oﬀ, even though the ”same” agent born in another state might be made better oﬀ. The
notion of Conditional Pareto Optimality is then weaker than the notion of Equal Treatment-Pareto
Optimality, according to which such transfers may be considered Pareto improving if they make all
agents better oﬀ in an expected sense. While Conditional Pareto Optimality seems to be natural it
also leads to some apparantly strange conclusions. For instance, it is easy to show that all sun-spot
equilibria in the model of Azariadis(1981) are conditionally Pareto Optimal (this observation is the
same as Proposition 6 of Cass and Shell(1983)). This is the motivation for studying a three period
model, where we have added a period, right after birth, to the life of (representative) agents. The only
eﬀect of this period is that is allows for an addition of utility across states of beliefs, as it would allow
for an addition of utility across sun-spot states in the Azariadis model. In this sense we move closer
to the concept of Equal Treatment-Pareto Optimality and the fact that this is possible with a minor
change of the model shows that the two concepts of optimality are not as disparate as they may seem.
Let us brieﬂy contrast the present work with that of Nielsen[1998a]. There the emphasis is not
on possible Pareto improvements but on the fact that agents are likely to have incorrect beliefs when
they hold Rationall Beliefs. It was shown for an OLG model with two countries that a monetary union
is better in an ex-post sense (see Hammond(1983)) than letting the exchange rate ﬂoat. The main
point was that, under a ﬂoating exchange rates, agents are likely to make forecasts that are wrong
and thus to make the wrong decisions about their portfolio of foreign and domestic currencies. Under
a monetary union such mistakes are not made, since there is only one currency to hold. Two points of
the paper deserve to be mentioned here. One is that it was not assumed that the government knows
more than the agents, yet from an ex-post point of view it could deem a monetary union to be superior.
Another is that it was only from an ex-post point of view that a monetary union was deemed better.
Indeed, if one were using the Pareto criterion the conclusion was likely to be the opposite: Agent
who are using non-stationary Rational Beliefs can be viewed as being optimistic about their ability to
8forecast - they believe they can read more out of the data than what is in the empirical distribution.
This common optimism among agents with rational beliefs means that there are trading possibilities
(i.e. possible”bets”) that are not being explored under a monetary union. Therefore it is unlikely to
lead to a Pareto Optimal allocation. In the present model, we expect that taking into account that
agents with Rational Beliefs make mistakes will make stabilizing policies even more attractive.
3 Stabilizing Policies
The following proposition consider price volatility in a monetary equilibrium. It is generalized to
generic utility functions in Appendix 4.1.
PROPOSITION 1 Suppose that @2u
@x1@x2 = 0. Then p1 and p2 are diﬀerent in a monetary equilibrium.





@x1(ea ¡ p;es + p)pk]qi¼k






@x2(ea ¡ p;es + p)p]qi¼k
s does, since @u
@x2(ea ¡ p;e1 + p) 6= @u
@x2(ea ¡ p;e2 + p), a
contradiction
REMARK 3
Suppose we were only considering a two period model, i.e. where each agent is born with his beliefs
and endowment, ea and have random endowments, eb or ec when old. Any (p1;p2) which for some









u(ea ¡ pk;es + pi)qi¼k
s (4)
constitutes a stationary conditionally Pareto Optimal allocation(see Appendix 4.2). The First Order


















(ea ¡ pj;es + pk)qk¼j
s = 0;k = 1;2 (5)










@x2(ea ¡ p1;es + p2)q2¼1
s and the conditions ( 5) will also hold
so that the monetary equilibrium is indeed Conditionally Pareto optimal. This remark (which is
generalized in Appendix 4.1) serves as a motivation for considering a 3-period model.
93.1 Pareto improving policies








u(ea ¡ pk;es + pi)qi¼k
s (6)
It is intuitively clear from this expression that the agent would like to be able to react on his own
belief (i.e. have his savings depend on the signal he receives) but would prefer that others were not
able to (i.e. would prefer that the return on his savings does not depend on other agents’ signals).
In a monetary equilibrium the prices are transfers between generations. To see if we can improve on









u(ea ¡ pk;es + pi)qi¼k
s (7)
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(ea ¡ pk;es + p2)q2¼k
s = 0 (9)
PROPOSITION 2 The Monetary Equilibrium is generically not Pareto Optimal
Proof: If we compare with the conditions ( 2) which hold in a monetary equilibrium it is easy to see












(ea ¡ p1;es + p2)¼1
s (10)
Again, without making the statement precise it is clear, that generically ( 8), ( 9), and ( 10) ( 3
equations with 2 unknowns) can generically not hold, meaning that a monetary equilibrium cannot
be conditionally Pareto Optimal. This is formally shown in Appendix 4.1.
The transfers in the solution to ( 7) are in general still random. Let us now consider another
problem. Suppose we restrict the young agents to making a transfer between the date when they are
middle aged and the date where they are old, independently of the beliefs they have, when middle









u(ea ¡ p;es + p)qi¼k
s (11)
A solution to this problem does not constitute a Conditionally Pareto Optimal allocation (see, Nielsen,2001
for deﬁnitions) - in particular there is a Tradeable Contingent Improvement to it . The reason is that
10with the rigid transfer scheme imposed by the solution to ( 11) there is no room for reaction to changes
in second period endowments, et.
It is now easy to see, that if preferences are time separable,then a solution to ( 7) has p1 = p2, i.e.
is a solution to ( 11).
PROPOSITION 3 Suppose @2u
@x1@x2 = 0. Then a solution to ( 7) has p1 = p2 and is a solution to ( 11).
Proof: The assumption implies that for any p @u
@x1(ea ¡ p;es + pi) = @u
@x1(ea ¡ p;es0 + pj);8i;j;s;s0. If
we let ˆ p be the solution to ( 11) is then easy to see that ( 8) and ( 9) hold with p1 = p2 = ˆ p
Under the stated conditions the result implies that in the Rational Expectations monetary equi-
libria studied here, if it is possible for the government to pursue a policy which results in the ﬁxed
price ˆ p then such a policy is better than the laisez faire policy. In other words it is desirable to remove
all volatility in economic activity related to the signal. Note that for utility functions in an open
neighbourhood of time separable utility functions the solution to ( 11) will still Pareto dominate the
Monetary Equilibrium. Before turning to how to implement the constant price let us brieﬂy consider
local changes in the two prices.
Suppose we are in a monetary equilibrium, so that ( 2) holds but that ( 10) does not hold, i.e. it












(ea ¡ p1;es + p2)¼1
s (12)
then the LHS of ( 8) is > 0, while the LHS of ( 9) is < 0. This means that if we slightly increase
the price associated with signal 1 and slightly decrease the other price then we increase utility for all
agents. To interprete this observation note the following result:
PROPOSITION 4 Assume ec < eb and ¼1
c < ¼2
c. If @2u
@x1@x2 ¸ 0 then p1 < p2.




















































(ea ¡ p2;es + pi)qi¼2
s
which implies that the condition, ( 2), for a monetary equilibrium cannot hold
Thus if the assumptions of the result hold as well as ( 12) then decreasing the ”price volatility”
slightly, by increasing the smaller price and decreasing the larger price increases welfare. Of course if
the assumptions of the result still hold but instead ( 12) holds with reverse inequality, then increasing
”price volatility” increases welfare.
3.2 Implementing the Pareto-improvement
Let ˆ p be the solution to ( 11). We ﬁnd a combination of ﬁscal and monetary policies that results in
the utility associated with ( 11) being obtained. Let Mt and pt be given s.t. Mtpt = ˆ p. Suppose the
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s
pt
Then let next period’s taxes be
¿k
t+1 = pk
t+1Mt ¡ ˆ p























s = 0 (13)





















@x2(ea ¡ ˆ p;es + ˆ p)¼k
s
= 0;k = 1;2
Thus M = Mt solves the problem of the agents with the future prices as deﬁned. Finally we deﬁne




t+1 = ˆ p
So the government is selling money to the middle aged, if ¿k
t+1 < 0, else it is buying money from the
old. With this combination of monetary and ﬁscal policies all uncertainty about the signal is removed,
12and the only uncertainty left is the fundamental uncertainty about the resources of the economy, when
the agents are old. It should be noted though, that the implicit assumptions about the information
available to the governments are quite strong. Most importantly, it is assumed that at any date, the
government is able to ﬁnd out what signal agents have received.












pt is large, inducing agents to transfer more. Also the growth in the money supply is smaller
than if the signal is bad. This is how the government in this simple model counteract tendencies to
decreased savings, and increased current consumption. Note also, that with this policy, there is no
price uncertainty for any agent. At date t the middle aged know what price will prevail in the following
period, t + 1.
REMARK 4
Suppose that preferences are time separable, i.e. @2u
@x1@x2 = 0. Let ¯ ¼s = q1¼1
s + q2¼2
s. Then we can








Inserting in ( 13) since
P
s2fb;cg[¡ @u
@x1(ea ¡ ˆ p;es + ˆ p)¼k







(ea ¡ ˆ p;es + ˆ p) +
@u
@x2
(ea ¡ ˆ p;es + ˆ p)¼s] = 0
since this is the First Order Conditions for solving (11). In this case, since pt =
ˆ p
Mt and pk






























13What happens to the money stock under the monetary policy considered here? Under the assumption












as T ! 1. This means that Mt ! 0 as T ! 1.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
The two versions of the model presented above, with respectively RE and RB are not exclusive.
However, it is an imperical matter to investigate, whether the main driving force behind ﬂuctuations
in prices is real informational shocks (or shocks to technology and preferences) or whether it is rather
ﬂuctuations in (subjective) beliefs.
Both the policies of the European Central Bank and the American Federal Reserve Board have,
wholy are partially, been directed towards stabilizing inﬂation, that is to keep inﬂation inside a target
zone. To achieve this goal interest rates are being adjusted in reaction to developments in the real
economy. Stabilizing prices (or price movements) will reduce the macroeconomic part of the price
uncertainty that agents face and as long as this price uncertainty is not already completely insurable
may have a positive impact on economic welfare. This was what the present study seeked to formalize.
However, if we take into account that agents typically have diverse and in particular wrong expectations
such stabilization has another beneﬁcial eﬀect (as was demonstrated, in another context in Nielsen,
1998a) namely in reducing the mistakes agents make in forecasting prices. That such an eﬀect is
intended may be seen from the Federal Reserve Board who’s policy has been to some extent geared
towards the American stock markets and in particular to preventing (probably unsuccessfully) a build-
up of a bubble and its consecutive burst. This two beneﬁcial eﬀects of an active stabilization policy
are not exclusive and may, for clarity best be studied separately.
4 Appendices
4.1 Generalization of the Results
The Generalized Model For the generalized model we assume that there are K ¸ 2 signals and thus
K conditional distributions ¼k;k = 1;:::;K, Furthermore, that there are S ¸ 2 states, e1 < e2 <






s ;8j. Let ¯ e = maxfe;e1;:::;eSg. The assumptions from 2.2 about u are maintained.






u(e ¡ pkM;es + piM)qi¼k
s (15)
is M = 1. Note that an equilibrium price will be in (0; ¯ e)K
The proof and the formulation of the following proposition follow Peled(1982).





(e;es) < 1;8s. Then there exists a monetary equilibrium for the
economy.
Proof: In step 1 of the proof existence of an equilibrium is shown and in step 2 it is shown that
in this equilibrium money has value. Consider normaliced prices for the consumptio and money,























, (C;M)(p) = [C1(p);:::;CK(p);M1(p);:::;MK(p)], and E(p) = (Ec(p);Em(p)) =






















k [Mk(p) ¡ 1] = 0:
Consider a sequence ∆n ½ int∆2K s.t. ∆n " ∆2K, where ∆n is non-empty, compact and convex.
From Debreu’s theorem it follows that for each n there is a (ˆ pn; ˆ En) s.t.
(i) ˆ pn 2 ∆n
(ii) ˆ En = E(ˆ pn)
(iii) ˆ Enp · 0;8p 2 ∆n
ˆ En is bounded from below by (e;e;::;e;1;::;1). It follows from (iii) that ˆ En is also bounded from
above. We conclude that (ˆ pn; ˆ En) has a convergent subsequence (ˆ pnq; ˆ Enq) ! (¯ p; ¯ E) 2 ∆2K £ <2K.
We have ¯ p ¯ E = 0 and ¯ Ep · 0;8p 2 ∆2K. Notice that if Mk(¯ p) = 0 i.e. Em
k (¯ p) = 0 then Ec
k(¯ p) = 0.
By (iii) we have that ¯ E · 0 (for if for some j, ¯ Ej > 0, choose pj = 1, pr = 0;r 6= j). Since ¯ E¯ p = 0,
if ¯ Em
k < 0, ¯ Pm
k = 0. Clearly, ¯ p 2 int∆2K it is an equilibrium price. Suppose that ¯ p 2 @∆2K. Clearly,
if ¯ pc À 0. Furthermore, we must have that ¯ pm
k = 0;8k. For else, if ¯ pm
k0 > 0 and ¯ pm
k = 0 we must have
that ˆ Enm










































































































































































































> 1 as n ! 1















If we consider what is inside the bracket in the reformulated FOC, be see that for this subsequence
and for k = k0 is is > 0;8i, which means that the equality cannot hold for all n for this k0
Regularity of the Monetary Equilibrium Let U be the set of C2 utility functions deﬁned on <2
++ which
are strictly increasing, strictly concave, and with indiﬀerence curves who’s closure is contained in <2
++.
Let U¤ be the subset of U for which a monetary equilibrium exists - it has non-empty interior. Deﬁne
F on U £ <K
++ with values in <K. Fk(u;p) is equal to the left hand side of ( 16) above (ignoring the
subscripts). Thus p > 0 is a Monetary Equilibrium price for the economy u if and only if F(u;p) = 0.
F is continuous.
PROPOSITION 6 For an open and dense set of utility functions u we have that if F(u;p) = 0 for some
p then there is an open ball, Bu containing u and an p 2 <K
++ s.t. for all u0 2 Bu we have that if
F(u0;p) = 0 then p ¸ p.
Proof: Suppose we have for some u that there is a sequence pn ! 0 s.t. F(u;pn) = 0;8n. We then have
F(u;0) = 0 something which obviously only hold for a closed no-where dense set of utility function.
Suppose then that there is p 2 <K
++ s.t. F(u;p) = 0 ) p > p. We can then not have a sequence
un ! u s.t. for each n there is pn · p with F(un;pn) = 0
Let V = fu 2 U : F(u;0) 6= 0g. Regularity for an economy u means that F(u;p) = 0;p > 0 )
@pF(u;p) has full rank i.e. rank K. The set of regular u contains an open set. For suppose that u
is regular and in V. If there were a sequence un ! u where un were not regular there would be a
sequence pn s.t. F(un;pn) = 0 and pn > 0 but j@pF(un;pn)j = 0;8n (where j ¢ j means determinant).
16Since pn is bounded (un;pn) has a cluster point (u; ¯ p), implying by the continuity of F and j@pFj that
F(u; ¯ p) = 0 (so that ¯ p > 0 and j@pF(u; ¯ pj = 0, a contradiction.























is K. Then the set of regular u is dense in U.
Proof: Pick any u 2 V. Then show that there is a sequence fung ! u s.t. 8n : ”F(un;p) = 0;p > 0 )
j@pF(un;p)j 6= 0. First we ﬁnd an open ball, B, around u and contained in U¤ s.t. (using Proposition
6) there is a lower bound p such that any equilibrium price p for u0 2 B is ¸ (p;:::;p). We consider
the following form of parametrization:




for (²;r1;:::;rL) 2 [0;¯ ²) £
QL
j=1 Rj where the Rjs are open intervals and uj(C1;C2) = ¡e¡rjC2.
In the proof we choose L and R1;:::;RL s.t. if we let ˆ F(²;r1;:::;rL;p) = F(u(²;r1;:::;rL);p) then
@ ˆ F(²;r1;:::;rL;p) has rank K for all (²;r1;:::;rL;p) 2 [0;¯ ²) £
QL
j=1 Rj £ [p; ¯ e)K. It follows from the
transversality theorem that the set of (²;r1;:::;rL) for which F(u(²;r1;:::;rL);p) = 0 ) j@pF(u(²;r1;:::;rL)j 6=
0 has full Lebesgue measure in [0;¯ ²) £
QL
j=1 Rj which implies the result.
We have








































































17We now let p be given and show in the two lemmas below that there are r1(p);:::;rK(p) such that the
K by K matrix A(r1;:::;rL;p) with elements akj(rj(p);p) has full rank. This implies that there are
open intervals, Rj(p) around rj and an open ball, B(p) around p such that for any (p;r1;:::;rK) 2
B(p)£R1(p)£¢¢¢£RK(p) we have full rank of A(r1;:::;rL;p). Now fB(p) : p 2 [p; ¯ e]Kg forms an open
covering of [p; ¯ e]K and consequently there is a ﬁnite subcover fB(ph)gH
h=1. We then let A(p;r1;:::;rL)




k=1 Rk(ph) and we see that A(p;r1;:::;rL)
has full rank. This completes the proof
LEMMA. 1 There are r1(p);:::;rK(p) such that the K by K matrix A(r1;:::;rL;p) with elements
akj(rj(p);p) has full rank



















We then ﬁnd 0 < rK¡1 < rK s.t. AK¡1(rK¡1) is not parallel to AK(rK). In the n’th step we ﬁnd 0 <
rK¡n < rK¡n+1 s.t. AK¡n(rK¡n) is not in the subspace spanned by [AK(rK);¢¢¢;AK¡n+1(rK¡n+1)].
For this procedure we need to show the following: Let ¯ r > 0. Then for all sets of K-vectors
[V1;:::;VK¡1] there is 0 < r < ¯ r s.t. Ak(r) = 2 span[V1;:::;VK¡1]. Letting N be a normal to
span[V1;:::;VK] it is enough to show that for all N 2 <K there is 0 < r < ¯ r s.t. Ak(r) ¢ N 6= 0.
If Ak(0) ¢ N 6= 0 then, by continuity, this also holds for some 0 < r < ¯ r. Consider then the case
where Ak(0) ¢ N = 0. If for all r 2 (0; ¯ r), Ak(r) ¢ N = 0 then, in particular, @lAk(0) ¢ N = 0 for
















s. Because of this form of the derivatives and the lemma below, we need

























































has maximal rank and let N 2 <K be a normal to the space spanned by the k columns in this matrix.










































As noted, we have
P
k Nk¼k






s we only need to show
that for a 2 <S n 0 there is l such that
P
s el
















as + a¯ s
#







as ! 0 and el
¯ sa¯ s ! sign(a¯ s)1, giving us the result
LEMMA. 2 Let Xi 2 <K;i = 1;2;::: Let L1 = 1 and for j = 2;3;::;K deﬁne Lj inductively s.t.
Lj is the smallest number s.t. [XL1;XL2;:::;XLj] has rank j assuming that such Lj exists. Let
Vi = ai1Xi + ai2X2 + ¢¢¢ + aiiXi, with aij 6= 0;8j. Then [VL1;VL2;:::;VLK] has maximal rank (K).
Proof: For every j VLj is linearly independent of [VL1;:::;VLj¡1]. Suppose not. There would be
®1;:::;®j s.t.
Pj






in contradiction with that XLj is linearly independent of [X1;:::;XLj¡1]
Genericity of Price Volatility
Let A = fp 2 <K
++ : p1 = p2 = ¢¢¢ = pKg and B = fu 2 V : F(u;p) = 0 ) p = 2 Ag. We show that
B is an open set. So let u 2 B and un ! u. Suppose there were for each n a pn 2 A \ [0; ¯ e]K s.t.
F(un;pn) = 0. Since A \ [0; ¯ e]K is compact pn has a cluster point, ¯ p 2 A, i.e., since F is continuous,
F(u; ¯ p) = 0, a contradiction.
Denseness of price volatility
PROPOSITION 8 Suppose the set fu 2 V : u is regularg is dense. Then B is dense.
19Proof: It is suﬃcient to show that for every u 2 fu 2 V : u is regularg there is a sequence un !
u s.t. un 2 B;8n. Such a u has ﬁnitely many equilibria, say p1;:::;pM. Consider the following
parametrization:




wherek1;k2;r1, and r2 are to be chosen.





































































































´ 1;8¸ 2 <
Note that we have @pF(u²;ph)j²=0 = @pF(u;ph) the last having full rank. So there is a unique Xh
s.t
¡[@pF(u;ph)]¡1Xh = 1























6= ¸Xh;8h = 1;2;::H;8¸ 2 <
. In other words we have
@ph
@² j²=0 6= ¸ 1;8h, so that for ² close to 0 we have the equilibrium prices for
u², ph
² 6= ¸ 1;8h
Pareto Optimality
We ﬁrst conﬁrm that a Monetary Equilibrium is conditionaly Pareto Optimal in the two-period
version of the more general model. For this model an allocation, characterized by the transfers/prices


















(e ¡ pj;es + pp)qk¼j

















(e ¡ pk;es + pj)qj¼k
s









¡d1 + c11 c12 c13 ¢ ¢ ¢ c1K












while ( 17) can be written (W1;:::;WK)¢H(p) = 0. The argument is now the same as in Peled(1984).
His Theorem 1 states that if H is an K by K matrix with positive oﬀ-diagonal elements and if there
is p À 0 s.t. H ¢ p = 0 then there is W À 0 s.t. W ¢ H(p) = 0
We next show that generically the Monetary Equilibrium in the model studied (the 3-period
version) is not Pareto Optimal. More precisely we show the following. Let Q = (q1;q2;:::;qK)
PROPOSITION 9 Assume that generically u is regular. For generic u we have that whenever H(u;p)¢
p = 0, Q ¢ H(u;p) 6= 0
Proof:
Let A = fu 2 V : F(u;p) = 0 ) Q ¢ H(u;p) 6= 0g. Suppose A were not open, i.e. there were a u in A
and a sequence un ! u and pn s.t. F(un;pn) = 0 = QH(un;pn). As usual pn has a cluster point ¯ p
giving the contradicting consequence, f(u; ¯ p) = 0 = QH(u; ¯ p) Before proving denseness we prove the
following lemma:
LEMMA. 3 Suppose that p is a particular Monetary Equilibrium for the regular economy u s.t.
(i) pi 6= pj for some i;j
(ii) Q ¢ H(u;p) = 0
There is then for every open ball, B around u an u0 2 B which is regular s.t. p is still an equilibrium
price for u0 but Q ¢ H(u0;p) 6= 0.




@C1(e ¡ p;eS + ¯ p)p = ¡
@g





@C2(e¡pk;eS +pj) = 0 for all k;j;s s.t. pk = 2 fp; ¯ pg or pj = 2 fp; ¯ pg or s = S.











(e ¡ pk;eS + ¯ p)¯ pqj¼k
s;8k s.t. pk = p
Let u² = u + ²g. There is ± > 0 s.t. for ² 2 [¡±;±] we have that u² fulﬁls the maintained assumptions
about preferences. We also have for all ² that H(u²;p) ¢ p = 0 i.e. that p is still an equilibrium for
the perturbed economy. H(u²;p) = H(u;p) + ˜ H where every row ˜ Hk = 0 if pk 6= p. If pk = p then




@C1(e ¡ pk;eS + ¯ p)qj¼k
s and ˜ Hkj =
@g
@C2(e ¡ pk;eS + ¯ p)qj¼k
s for all j s.t. pj = ¯ p, else
˜ Hkj = 0. It follows that ˜ Hk¢p = 0;8k i.e. that H(u²;p)¢p = 0. Let j be such that pj = ¯ p. The column
H(u²;p)¢;j has the form H(u;p)¢;j + ˜ H¢;j, where ˜ Hkj =
@g
@C2(e¡pk;eS + ¯ p)qj¼k
s whenever pk = p, 0 else.
It follows that Q ¢ ˜ H¢;j 6= 0, while Q ¢ H(u;p)¢;j = 0 so that Q ¢ H(u²;p)¢;j 6= 0
We now ﬁnish the proof of the Proposition. We have to show that for all u and all open balls,
B containing u, B \ A 6= ;. Since the set of u which are regular and have the feature that for all
equilibrium prices p, pj 6= pi for some i;j is open and dense, we can assume that u has these features.
By regularity there are then only ﬁnitely many Monetary Equilibria for u, say p1;:::;pN. Let B be
an open ball around u so small that the equilibrium prices can be parametrized by N continuous
functions, gn : B ! (0; ¯ e]K;n = 1;:::;N.
Start with p1. If Q ¢ H(u;p1) = 0 pick according to the lemma u1 in B s.t H(u1;p1) ¢ p = 0 but
Q¢H(u1;p1) 6= 0. Else let u1 = u. In the j’th step we have uj¡1 with equilibria (pj¡1;1;:::;pj¡1;N) s.t.
Q¢H(uj¡1;pj¡1;i) 6= 0 for i · j¡1. These inequalities will continue to hold in an open neighborhood,
Bj¡1 ½ B of uj¡1. Consider pj¡1;j. If Q ¢ H(uj¡1;pj¡1;j) = 0 pick according to the lemma a uj in
Bj¡1 s.t. H(uj;pj¡1;j) ¢ p = 0 but Q ¢ H(uj;pj¡1;j) 6= 0. Else let uj = uj¡1. uN then has the desired
properties
For the more general version of the model is still straigt forward to show that Proposition 3 still
holds.
4.2 Brief Introduction to Rational Beliefs
The generic set of variables is denoted H, a subset of <L. Depending on the context it can be a set
of observable or unobservable variables. For any set Y we will denote by B(Y ) the Borel algebra for
Y . Let T : H1 ! H1 be the shift transformation i.e. T(H1;H2;:::) = T(H2;H3:::). Let ¹ be a
probability measure on (H1;B(H1)) so that (H1;B(H1);¹;T) is a dynamical system. Finally, let
C(H1) be the cylinders. The following deﬁnitions are taken from Kurz[1994a] :
22DEFINITION 2 Stability: The dynamical system (H1;B(H1);¹;T) as well as the measure ¹ are said







exists for ¹-a.a. h
For the case we are studying when the system is stable there is an associated stationary measure,
¯ ¹ s.t. ¯ ¹(C) is the limit of the sequence in the above deﬁnition. This ¯ ¹ is the empirical distribution of
the stochastic process and is assumed to be known by all agents.
To know that the true but unknown dynamical system (H1;B(H1);¹;T) generates ¯ ¹ is not the
same as knowing ¹ . There are many possible stable dynamical systems which will generate the same
stationary measure.
DEFINITION 3 A probability measure ½ on (H1;B(H1)) is said to be a Weakly Rational Belief for
the stable dynamical system (H1;B(H1);¹;T) if ¯ ½ = ¯ ¹.
Thus a belief ½ is rational, if it generates the same empirical distribution as the one being observed.
In this paper we use rational beliefs which are generated by a random signal/sunspot, z and two
one-period beliefs, Bi;i = 1;2. We assume that the empirical distribution is i.i.d. with one-period
distribution ¯ B. Thus we can phrase the rationality conditions in terms of one-period beliefs only as
in (3).
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